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2ABSTRACT
The age and production type, i.e. origin, are highly important parameters to be revealed
when seized Pu from illicit trafficking has to be analysed. In addition, in a view of pending Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty, the age determination of Pu enables to control the agreement.
The ages of Pu bulk samples were determined from the 238Pu/234U, 239Pu/235U and
240Pu/236U ratios by IDMS and the results were compared to the ages obtained from the
241Pu/241Am ratio by gamma-spectrometry. The ages from three different Pu/U ratios were
uniform showing that the Pu/U separation, when reprocessing the spent fuel, was complete. Small
differences between ages from the Pu/U and Pu/Am ratios were observed, giving consistently
higher ages of a few per cent from the 241Pu/241Am ratio. This is most likely due to the Am traces
remained in Pu after the reprocessing.
Particle analyses were performed from the above mentioned Pu/U ratios by SIMS. Due to
the different ionisation efficiencies of Pu and U, a relative sensitivity factor (RSF) had to be
determined for the Pu/U ratio. The RSF was then applied to correct the measured ratios. The
SIMS showed its strength when using the technique to determine the age of powder mixtures. The
ages of different components are possible to reveal, which is a big advantage compared to the bulk
analysis, where this is not possible.
The production of the Pu material, i.e. the reactor type, was determined using the isotopic
correlation technique. The Pu compositions for different spent fuels (Candu, LWR, graphite-
moderated LWR, Magnox, fast reactor and typical research reactors) were calculated by
ORIGEN2 and SCALE computer codes and they were plotted in the graph, which separates the
reactor types depending on their characteristic neutron spectra and initial 235U enrichments. The
reactor types were possible to reveal in most of the cases and when not, these reactor types could
be excluded to be the origin.
A new detector type TIMS, Multi-Micro-Channeltron-TIMS, was introduced. The MMC-
TIMS allows the reduction of the needed sample amount by a factor of 1000 compared to the
conventional Faraday cup detector TIMS. This is very important because it is desired to manage
as small samples as feasible when handling health hazardous materials like actinides.
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61. Introduction
At the end of 1998, there was over 1350 tons of plutonium (Pu) in the world. This Pu has
been produced either as a by-product from spent nuclear fuels (~1100 t) or for nuclear weapons
(~250 t) [1]. Pu has been produced mainly by a few countries, i.e. nuclear weapon countries and
countries which produce a lot of their energy by nuclear power. These countries include USA,
Canada, Russia, France, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan.
The diversion of Pu is a big issue, not only because of its hazardous nature, but also in a
view of non-proliferation. Most of the Pu is in spent fuel form, i.e. it has not been separated from
the uranium and fission products. This Pu is hardly a matter of concern in a view of proliferation
of the nuclear weapon material, because it is very dangerous and thus difficult to transport due to
its high radioactivity of fission products. This makes it also easy to detect. Separated Pu for
nuclear weapons or for the use of MOX fuel is, in the other hand, much easier to transport,
because of its relatively low radioactivity and small size (i.e. a size of soft-drink can is ~7 kg of
Pu).
In the beginning of 1990’s, the break-up of the Soviet Union caused a problem for the
safeguarding of the nuclear material. The Former Soviet Union countries (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Lithuania) had suddenly large amounts of Pu and high enriched uranium (HEU)
and, at the same time, no proper legislation or control of the material was available. As a
consequence of this, some nuclear material was lost and first illicit trafficking incidents of nuclear
material occurred. In the year 1994, a total of 42 smuggling cases of nuclear material were
detected. This was 65 % of the total smuggling incidents, which includes also radioactive sources.
Since then the number of cases has decreased year by year and in the 1999 (till end of August)
only 4 smuggling incidents of nuclear material were recorded in the IAEA’s illicit trafficking
database [2].
The concern about the growth of nuclear weapon material brought about the discussion on
cut-off the fissile material production for nuclear weapons at the initiative of the President Clinton
in 1993. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would ban the Pu and HEU production for
use of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The treaty would cover all the
sensitive fissile material production facilities, i.e. enrichment, reprocessing and fabrication plants.
Nuclear forensic science is a new multidisciplinary area, which deals with the identification
and determination of nuclear materials mostly in a context of criminal investigation. It uses the
characteristics inherent to a nuclear material to obtain information on the origin and production
7route of the sample under investigation. The first nuclear forensic case could be said to be the
“Oklo” - a uranium mine situated in Gabon, Africa. In 1972 it was noticed that the enrichment of
the natural U was lower in Oklo than normally. By studying the fission products found, it was
observed that there had been a natural nuclear reactor operating about 1.8 billion years ago [3,4].
Even if the nuclear forensics implies typically the analyses of uranium and plutonium material,
sometimes analyses of non-nuclear elements are also performed. This is specially the case, when
scrap material is sold in black-markets as nuclear weapon usable material. The most notorious
nuclear hoax is so-called “Red Mercury” [5,6].
In this study a methodology to determine the origin of reactor produced Pu was
developed, which can be used in the case of seized Pu and for the cut-off treaty. The origin means
in this context the age, i.e. the time that has passed since the Pu material was reprocessed or
purified, and production type, i.e. the reactor type where the Pu was produced. These two
parameters, together with the impurity and microstructure analyses and databank, make it
possible, though not in every case, to find the exact origin. At least these data can be used to
exclude the place where the material cannot originate. To determine these parameters accurately
and precisely, which is the necessity due to the sensitive nature of the subject, mass spectrometric
techniques, TIMS, SIMS and ICP-MS, were chosen. These techniques are known to represent
state of the art in isotope ratio and content determination for the varying sample sizes contained in
this study.
82. Nuclear forensic science
Forensic science is comprised of several technical disciplines that are applied to matters of
law. For example, forensic toxicology concerns the examination of body fluids, tissues, and other
biological material in order to detect poisons that may relate to the cause and manner of death.
Forensic geology deals with soils including minerals, fossils, trace metals, and dissolved rocks,
where the soil composition reflects glacial movements and climatic conditions. Forensic chemistry
is principally an application of analytical chemistry within a legal context, and it includes arson
chemistry, explosives, drugs and trace evidences (e.g. in glass, paints). During the last decade,
nuclear material has become a part of the forensic sciences and a new branch - nuclear forensics -
has developed.
In nuclear forensics, unknown uranium or plutonium containing material has to be
analysed and its origin, intended use and production route unravelled. This can be done using the
characteristics inherent to the nuclear material. The possible sources of nuclear forensic samples
are: 1) operational and accidental releases from nuclear installations, 2) atmospheric and
underground bomb tests, and 3) diversion from weapon production or commercial fuel cycle, i.e.
illicit trafficking. There is no fixed scheme of analysis for unknown nuclear material, which is
contrary to the present verification analysis for a declared nuclear material, but it is guided by the
pattern of information that builds up during the investigation. Nuclear material analysis, though
essential, is only a part of nuclear forensics. Therefore information of intelligence services as well
as the circumstance of seizing or sampling the material has to also be considered.
2.1 Illicit trafficking
Illicit trafficking involves unauthorised movement of nuclear material and other radioactive
sources. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material has arisen in the beginning of the 1990’s, which has
been believed mainly to be due to the disruption of the Former Soviet Union  (FSU). Undeveloped
inventory control and security together with 75 tons stockpile of plutonium and several hundred
tons of highly enriched uranium (≥20 % 235U) from disarmament of Cold War nuclear weapons
scattered among 80 to 100 facilities enabled easier diversion of nuclear material. Besides this, it
has been estimated that Russia has between 35 and 50 tons of plutonium in the form of solutions,
scrap and residues [7]. Total military plutonium amount in the world is about 250 tons, and over
990 % of that is in separated form. Additionally, at the end of 1998, 200 tons of separated
plutonium from civil nuclear power plants have been estimated existing [1].
Since the beginning of 1993, over 300 smuggling incidents of nuclear material and
radioactive sources have been listed in the IAEA illicit trafficking database. 265 of the cases have
been confirmed by Member States [2]. Main part of the seizures and also the most serious ones
were made in Germany, the Czech Republic and Russia (Fig.1). In 1993-1996 over 60 % of the
smuggling incidents were nuclear material. The rest were radioactive sources, like 137Cs- or 60Co-
sources used in the medicine and research. Since then the number of nuclear material cases has
decreased and in 1999 their proportion was only 20 %. The smuggled nuclear material has
contained mainly depleted, natural or low enriched uranium for use in nuclear power reactors, but
a number involving weapon-utilisable nuclear material, i.e. highly enriched uranium (HEU) or
plutonium, have also occurred (Table 1) [8,9].
Fig.1. Sites of nuclear smuggling incidents in Europe and FSU by 1995 [8].
The quantities of the smuggled plutonium and HEU have been, until now, too low to make
a nuclear weapon as it is known that a nuclear bomb requires between three and 25 kilograms of
HEU or between one and eight kilograms of plutonium depending on the composition and the
production technology [8]. However, trafficking of small quantities of such material can help to
accumulate larger quantities of nuclear material of strategic value in the context of non-
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proliferation. Potential customers of the smuggled nuclear material have been considered to be
terrorist groups and on the other hand, in the light of proliferation, rogue nations like Iraq, Iran
and Libya [10].
Table 1. Smuggled plutonium and HEU incidents [2].
Date Place Quantity and type of material
10.05.1994 Tengen, Germany 5.6 g 239Pu (0.18 % 240Pu)
25.07.1994 Munich, Germany 240 mg 239Pu (11.4 % 240Pu)
and 170 mg HEU (36.5 %)
10.08.1994 Munich airport, Germany 363 g 239Pu (10.78 % 240Pu)
and 560 g LEU
12.08.1994 Bremen, Germany 0.05 mg Pu
03.1994
Electrostal, Russia 2.972 kg HEU (90 %)
13.06.1994 Landshut, Germany 0.8 g HEU (87.8 %)
14.12.1994 Prague, Czech Republic 2.73 kg HEU (87.7 %)
06.1995
Electrostal, Russia 1.7 kg HEU (20 %)
06.06.1995 Prague, Czech Republic 0.415 g HEU (87.7 %)
08.06.1995 Ceske Budejovice, Czech
Republic
16.958 g HEU (87.7 %)
29.05.1999 Rousse, Bulgaria 10 g HEU (>20 %)
2.1.1 Programmes to prevent illicit trafficking
After the explosive increase of illicit trafficking incidents in the beginning of 1990’s,
actions to prevent further incidents of illicit trafficking were worked out. In 1994 IAEA launched
a programme, Security of Material, to address illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other
radioactive sources. The programme has been arranged between IAEA and its Member States
with close co-operation of scientific community, law enforcement organisations and transporters,
such as United Nations, the European Union, Interpol, Europol, Euratom, International Air
Transport Association, International Road Transport Union, World Custom Organisation and the
Universal Postal Union. The programme has focused on four main activities: prevention, response,
training and the exchange of information. Firstly in greater detail, the prevention part of the
programme helps countries to strengthen their basic nuclear laws and infrastructures, to upgrade
their accounting, control and security of nuclear and radioactive sources, as well as improve their
control of the import and export of strategic goods and materials. Secondly, the response part
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helps countries to detect and react to illegal cross-border movements of radioactive materials and
analyse confiscated material. Additionally it provides authoritative and timely information on
trafficking incidents reported to the IAEA illicit trafficking database, in which currently 60 States*
are participating. Thirdly, the programme develops and provides training opportunities for both
state regulatory and facility personnel, and fourthly, it enhances the exchange of information via
international and inter-agency meetings and conferences [12,13].
The United States of America have developed programmes for a co-operation with Russia
to strengthen the security of the nuclear warheads and nuclear materials. In 1991 the congress
launched the “government-to-government” programme called Nunn-Lugar to assist the former
Soviet Union in the transportation, storage, safeguarding, destruction of nuclear weapons and the
prevention of weapon proliferation. Additionally, the DOE started a so called “lab-to-lab”
programme, in which materials security experts at its national laboratories were authorised to
approach their Russian counterparts directly to propose joint work on material security [14].
* Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of
Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, the United States of America, Venezuela and Vietnam [11]
2.1.2 International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling
To recognise the capability of nuclear forensics, the P-8 countries encouraged technical
experts to evaluate the role of nuclear forensics in combating nuclear smuggling and possibly
developing mechanisms for international co-operation. As a result, an International Conference on
Nuclear Smuggling Forensic Analysis was held in November 1995 at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, USA. The International Conference comprised scientists, law enforcement
and intelligence experts from 14 countries and organisations and it culminated with plans to found
a Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG). The first meeting of ITWG
was held in January 1996 at the Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe, Germany and
since then it has had meetings yearly [15,16]. One of its first tasks was to make an inventory of
the technical tools available at that time for nuclear forensic analyses. It was soon recognised that
new methods had to be developed to meet novel requirements. Later, in 1998 ITWG initiated its
first inter-laboratory exercise, called Round-Robin test, on Pu to evaluate and improve the
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effectiveness of forensic techniques and methods [17]. The second Round-robin test on HEU is
planned to be organised in 2001 [18].
2.2 Endogenous information
Material that underwent nuclear processes shows an inherent consistency of its nuclides,
which point back to the nuclear processes in which the material was involved. Thus such so-called
endogenous information is self-explanatory and requires no verification by comparison with
material of established history. From this endogenous information, the general origin (i.e. the age
and production mode) and the intended use of the material can be determined.
When considering reactor produced Pu material, a lot of information has been lost when
the spent fuel has been reprocessed. Thus the useful information of the fission products and minor
actinides are mostly gone and the origin of Pu material can be found out only from the information
obtained from Pu isotopes themselves and their in-growing daughter nuclides.
2.2.1 Age
Age determination or dating is very commonly used in geo- and cosmochemistry. Several
parent/daughter relations exist, from which the age can be determined. Most commonly used
dating methods for rocks and minerals are: 40K-40Ar, 40K-40Ca, 87Rb-87Sr, 147Sm-143Nd, 176Lu-
176Hf, 187Re-187Os, 235,238U,232Th-206,207,208Pb [19].
Age determination is based on the decay of a radioactive parent nuclide N to its daughter
nuclide D. The rate of decay of a radioactive nuclide is expressed:
N
dt
dN λ=− (1)
where λ is the decay constant (
2/1
2ln
T  ) of the nuclide.  From the equation 1, the basic equation
describing all radioactive decay processes is formed:
N = N0e-λt (2)
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where N is the number of remained atoms of the parent nuclide after time t and N0 is the number
of atoms of the parent nuclide in the beginning. The number of stable daughter atoms (D)
produced by the decay is given by:
D = N0 – N (3)
D = N0 – N0e-λt (4)
D = N0 (1 - e-λt) (5)
Equation 5 is valid for all above-mentioned dating methods, where the decay product is stable.
However, this is not valid for Pu, whose daughter nuclides are all radioactive and decaying
further. In this case the decay rate of the daughter nuclide N2 is the difference between the rate at
which it is produced by decay of N1 (parent nuclide) and its own decay rate:
2211
2 NN
dt
dN λλ −= (6)
The number of formed daughter nuclides after time t is expressed by the equation:
ttt eNeeNN 221 02
0
1
12
1
2 )( λλλλλ
λ
−−− +−
−
= (7)
If the initial number of daughter atoms N 02 is zero, the equation 7 reduces to:
)( 2101
12
1
2
tt eeNN λλ
λλ
λ
−−
−
−
= (8)
The “age” of the Pu expresses the time that has passed since the Pu was last time
chemically processed, i.e. reprocessed or purified. The age can be determined for reactor
produced Pu from a few parent/daughter ratios, which are: 238Pu/234U, 239Pu/235U, 240Pu/236U,
241Pu/241Am and 242Pu/238U (equations 9-13).
238Pu → 234U → … … → 206Pb (stable) (9)87.76 a
α
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239Pu → 235U → … …→ 207Pb (stable) (10)
240Pu → 236U → … …→ 208Pb (stable) (11)
241Pu → 241Am → … …→ 209Bi (stable) (12)
242Pu → 238U → … …→ 206Pb (stable) (13)
Later in the dating, some assumptions have been made concerning the parent/daughter-system:
1) No daughter nuclide was present at the start of decay time, i.e. the parent was completely
separated from the daughters at one point of time.
2) The system was not altered during the time under consideration, i.e. the daughter was not
separated, partially or wholly from the parent, and neither parent nor daughter was added
to the system at any time.
2.2.2 Production type
The production type, i.e. the reactor type, of plutonium can be deduced from the isotopic
abundances that are unchanged by chemical processes. Plutonium composition varies significantly
between different reactor types depending on the neutron energy spectrum and the initial 235U
enrichment of the reactor. For example, with increasing 235U enrichment, the build-up of 238Pu is
enhanced, whereas the hardening of the neutron spectrum leads to lower abundances of the higher
Pu isotopes. Additionally the neutron flux affects the production of Pu isotopes causing relatively
higher amounts of the 240Pu compared to the 239Pu at higher fluxes.
After the reactor type is determined, the result helps to identify the reprocessing plant. One
reprocessing plant usually reprocess only one type of reactor fuel, thus finding out the reactor type
(i.e. HWR, LWR, RBMK, FBR, and research reactor), the origin can be limited to such
reprocessing plants which reprocess the spent fuel in question. Since it is in most cases known
where the reprocessing plants obtain their spent fuels, the origin can be confined to these reactors.
24130 a
α
6568 a
α
14.41 a
β-
373800 a
α
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2.2.3 Intended use
The isotopic composition of uranium and plutonium points directly to the intended use of
nuclear material. There are three categories into which nuclear material can fall (Table 2).
Table 2. Nuclear material classification [15].
Nuclide Concentration Classification
239Pu
235U
> 90 %
> 93 %
weapons grade
239Pu, 241Pu
235U
any concentration
> 20 %
weapons-utilisable
235U < 20 % non-weapons utilisable
Intended use can be recognised also by the chemical composition of metallic or ceramic material,
or by the dimensions of fuel pellets. This, however, concerns more uranium and, on the other
hand, a databank including these particular parameters is required to interpret this kind of
information (Chapter 2.3.).
2.3 Exogenous information
From the fabrication of a nuclear material, traces of non-nuclear elements remain and they
are characteristic of the production technology, reagent composition and geographic location
where the material was produced. To link the results of an investigation to a particular process
and/or production facility, the corresponding process parameters have to be known. To some
extent they can be found in the open literature, but the specified data such as material structure
and impurities are often known only in the respective facility. Therefore a databank, which
contains such exogenous information, is required to interpret the data. Since 1996, data from the
fuel manufacturers have been collected in identical databanks established in the Institute of
Transuranium Elements, Karlsruhe, Germany and Bochvar’s Research Institute of Inorganic
Materials, Moscow, Russia [20-22]. The databanks include data on fresh nuclear fuel used in FSU
and European commercial power reactors. The range of the parameters is limited to specific data
which are characteristic for origin and intended use of nuclear material. These are e.g. data from
macroscopic parameters (i.e. fuel pellet dimensions), chemical and isotopic compositions,
impurities (e.g. Fe, Cr, Ni, Al, Ca, Si, F, Cl) and roughness of the fuel pellet surface. At the
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moment the databanks serve more for uranium origin determination, but new parameters like
microstructure and morphological characteristics of powders (e.g. platelet and grain sizes), data of
mixed oxide fuels in LWRs, and HEU and Pu in research reactors are planned to be included. This
additional data can help in the origin determination of the plutonium.
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3. Plutonium
Plutonium (Pu) is element 94 in the periodic table and is named after the planet Pluto. It is
an artificial element that is produced in natural or slightly enriched uranium fuelled thermal nuclear
reactors, in fast-breeder reactors or as a by-product in other reactors. The first synthesised
plutonium 238Pu was produced by the bombardment of uranium with deuterons in the cyclotron in
the University of California, Berkeley in 1941 by Seaborg, McMillan, Kennedy and Wahl. 239Pu
was produced shortly thereafter by the capture in 238U of neutrons produced by (d,n) reactions.
Till now 16 plutonium isotopes (232Pu-247Pu) with certified half-lives have been produced [23].
Plutonium is valuable in nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons because neutrons of all energies
induce fission in 239Pu.
In nature plutonium occurs in uranium ores as a result of the capture in 238U of neutrons of
spontaneous fission and alpha-neutron reactions. The concentration of plutonium is, however,
extremely minute, only the order of one part in 1011 of uranium present. Also trace amounts of
244Pu, the longest living plutonium isotope, have been found in cerium ore as surviving remnants
of plutonium present at the formation of the earth. Plutonium is a very radiotoxic element,
because of high rate of emission of alpha particles. It normally exists in biological systems in the
+4 oxidation state. As ingested Pu is rather harmless, because it is not absorbed in the
gastrointestinal tract. However, inhaled Pu concentrates in bone, liver and kidneys, where its
biological half-life is up to 100 years [24].
3.1 Reactor produced plutonium
In nuclear reactors, where uranium fuel is irradiated, plutonium isotopes of 238Pu-242Pu
with smaller quantities of other isotopes (e.g. 236Pu and 244Pu) are produced. Pu isotopes are the
result of neutron capture in 238U and subsequent beta decays to 239Pu that further captures
neutrons as shown in Fig.2. 238Pu has also an alternative route of formation from 235U [26]:
PuNpnNpUnUnU 238238237237236235 →→+→→+→+
−− ββ (14)
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Fig.2. The production of plutonium from neutron irradiation of natural uranium [25].
Plutonium may be produced from 238U in a reactor with any type of neutron spectrum, i.e. thermal
or fast. A large variation in the plutonium composition is perceived as a result of differences in the
average cross sections of the various isotopes over the different neutron spectra (Table 3). In
general, more fissions per atom of plutonium occur in the fast spectrum than in the thermal
spectrum. Thus plutonium formed in a fast reactor is predominantly 239Pu, whereas significant
quantities of the heavier isotopes are present in the plutonium from thermal reactors (LWR,
HWR, Graphite Moderated Reactor). Among the thermal reactors, neutron moderator qualities
decrease in the order of the used moderator D2O > C > Be > H2O resulting the softest (i.e. the
most thermal) neutron spectrum in HWR [26]. Besides the moderator, also burn-up (i.e. power
level times irradiation time), neutron flux and initial 235U enrichment of the uranium fuel are
reactor type specific and have an influence on the plutonium composition.
Table 3. The nuclear data of main Pu isotopes [23,26].
Isotope T1/2 (a) Neutron capture
cross section (b)
Fission cross
section (b)
Neutron capture
cross section (b)
Fission cross
section (b)
Thermal neutrons (0.025 eV) Fast neutrons (1 MeV)
238Pu 87.74 510 17 - -
239Pu 2.411× 104 270 752 0.04 1.73
240Pu 6563 290 0.044 0.18 1.06
241Pu 14.35 370 1010 2.0 1.56
242Pu 3.750× 105 19 < 0.2 - -
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Nuclear reactors can be divided in three categories depending on the purpose they serve.
1) Commercial reactors are used to produce electricity, 2) military reactors create materials for
nuclear weapons, and 3) research reactors develop nuclear weapon or energy production
technology, but additionally they are also used for training purposes, nuclear physics
experimentation, and producing radioisotopes for medicine and research (Table 4).
Table 4. Main nuclear reactor types [26,27].
Reactor
type
Subtype Chemical
composition
of the fuel
Enrichment Moderator Coolant Purpose
LWR PWR UO2 low-enriched H2O H2O electricity, nuclear
powered ships
BWR UO2 low-enriched H2O H2O electricity
HWR - UO2  nat. U or
slightly-enriched
D2O D2O electricity,
Pu production
Graphite
Moderated
Gas cooled;
Magnox
UO2, UC2 or
metal
nat. U or
slightly-enriched
graphite CO2 or He electricity,
Pu production
Reactor Water cooled;
RBMK
UO2 or
metal
Slightly-
enriched
graphite H2O electricity,
Pu production
FBR LMFBR PuO2/UO2 Various
mixtures
of 239Pu and 235U
- liq. Na electricity,
Pu production
3.2 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) was proposed the first time already in 1956 by
President Eisenhower, but it was rejected for decades due to the political situation between the
USA and Russia. In 1993 President Clinton initiated the discussion again. This led to an
agreement to begin negotiations on the FMCT at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) in
1995 [28].
The FMCT would strengthen nuclear non-proliferation norms by adding a binding
international commitment to existing constraints on nuclear weapons-usable fissile material. The
treaty would ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear
explosive devices. Even if the scope is limited, i.e. only a ban of future production, it must be
ensured that material produced in the future is not falsely declared as earlier production.
Therefore, all civilian and military materials produced after entry into force would need to be put
under safeguards. However, this is not alone enough, but also a method is needed in the
verification of the FMCT. There the age determination plays crucial role, because it is the only
tool, which safeguards authorities have in order to verify the observance of law.
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4. Isotopic correlation technique
The isotopic correlation technique (ICT) was developed on the 1970’s in the framework
of safeguards to verify the Pu-content of spent fuel assemblies. Later ICT was extended to verify
the consistency of the isotopic analyses performed at the reprocessing plant input and to deduce
the amount of specific isotopes in the fuel from measurement of other isotopes using established
corrections. Correlations can be divided into three categories:
1) Correlations based on isotopes of heavy elements (235,236,238U-, 238-242Pu-, 241,243Am- and
242,244Cm)
2) Correlations based on isotopes of stable fission products (83,84,86Kr, 131,132,134,136Xe,
143,145,146,148Nd)
3) Correlations based on isotopes of radioactive fission products (106Ru, 134,137Cs, 144Ce,
154Eu)
The experimental data for the correlations was obtained using reprocessing data on oxide fuels
from various reactors. Following correlations were established: Correlations between 1) two
isotope ratios, 2) isotope content and isotope ratio, 3) two isotope contents, 4) isotope ratio or
isotope content and fuel burn-up or 235U depletion [29-31] (Fig.3).
Fig.3. Examples of  isotopic correlations a) 235U/238U vs. 240Pu/239Pu atom ratio,
          b) 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio vs. fuel burn-up [30].
4.1 Computer codes
Burn-up codes are used to compute the composition of the spent fuels. The most
commonly used code is ORIGEN, which was written at ORNL [32]. A modified version from
a)
b)
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ORIGEN, called KORIGEN has been developed at the FZK (German national research centre in
Karlsruhe) to support more European reactor and fuel types [33]. In principle the burn-up codes
solve the system of differential equations that describe the evolution of the isotopic vector, taking
into account the radioactive decay and the neutron induced reactions. For this the codes need the
decay modes with half-lives, the average cross sections of the neutron induced reactions and the
neutron flux. The above-mentioned computer codes meet their most difficult problem in the values
of cross sections, because these values are strongly dependent on the energy distribution of the
neutron spectrum. The spectrum changes from a reactor to another, between different regions
within the same reactor and with time due to the evolution of the fuel composition with the burn-
up. The solution to these problems can be solved by computer codes such as SCALE, where the
calculations are more realistic, but much more time consuming and complicated [34].
4.1.1 ORIGEN2
ORIGEN2 is a revision and update of the original ORIGEN computer code. It is a
versatile point-depletion and radioactive decay code for use in simulating nuclear fuel cycles. The
code calculates the composition and other related properties of nuclear materials and forms the
basis for the study and design of fuel reprocessing plants, waste treatment and disposal facilities. It
is also used for risk analyses calculations and support of nuclear power licensing and regulation.
ORIGEN2 databases contain in total 1700 nuclides divided into three categories: 130
actinides, 850 fission products and 720 activation products. The cross-section libraries cover the
main commercial reactors and fuel types, such as uranium and U-Pu cycle PWRs and BWRs,
thorium-based fuel PWRs, once-through uranium cycle CANDUs and U-Pu and thorium cycle
LMFBRs. The structure of the input is simple and normally only a few changes have to be done to
the standard input. The changing parameters are the libraries of reactor and fuel type, initial fuel
composition, final burn-up, irradiation time and power level/neutron flux. A typical example of the
input is presented in Appendix A. In the output, besides the isotopic composition, it is possible to
obtain parameters like radioactivity (alpha and total), thermal power, neutron-induced fission and
neutron absorption rate, (α,n)-reaction and spontaneous fission neutron production rate. Also
parameters concerning the risk to health like chemical ingestion, radioactive ingestion and
inhalation hazards can be obtained in the output [35,36].
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4.1.2 SCALE
SCALE is not a single code, but a collection of several codes, each one performing
different tasks with a standardised input/output system that allows one to enter automatically the
output results of a module as input data for the following one. Normally, the so-called SAS2H
sequence (Appendix B) is used to compute spent fuel composition. Although SCALE is more
sophisticated than ORIGEN, still some assumptions have to be made in the calculations. The
strongest assumption is that the described pin is considered as representative of the entire
assembly. Thus, local effects such as corner pins or pins close to heterogeneities (e.g. absorbers,
guide tubes, poisoned pins) can hardly be reproduced. The second limitation is that the SAS2H
procedure can take into account just a single evolving composition and pins with different
enrichment inside the same assembly must be treated either separately or mixed together by giving
an average enrichment to the whole fuel assembly. A minor limitation is that full pellets have to be
considered in the calculations because of the bad modelling in the pellets with central holes
[34,37].
4.1.3 Accuracy of the computer code calculations
Verification of the composition predictions is a wide-ranging subject due to the large
number of nuclides accommodated by the computer codes. The assumption is generally made that
most of the fission products will be accurate if the actinide build-up and depletion are correct
because they are heavily dependent on the fission yields, which are relatively well known. For this
reason, verification efforts have been concentrated on the actinide region.
Regarding plutonium isotope calculations, comparisons between computer code
calculations and experimental data have been made for ORIGEN2 and SCALE. ORIGEN2
calculations give reasonably accurate results for the main Pu isotopes, 239Pu, 240Pu and 241Pu, in
PWR, where the discrepancy is mainly within a few per cent. The isotopes 238Pu and 242Pu are,
however, both consistently underestimated, having discrepancy close to 10 % [35]. The more
extensive study of SCALE shows the same trend for all studied reactor types, i.e. PWR, PWR-
MOX, BWR and Candu. However, it also points out the difficulties in BWR and PWR-MOX
calculation, where the differences between calculated and experimental values of individual cases
can be sometimes close to 30 % [37,38].
23
5. Mass spectrometric techniques
Thermal ionisation and secondary ion mass spectrometry are reviewed in a frame of their
principles and peculiarities. The secondary ion mass spectrometry is used in this study as an
analytical technique for particles, whereas the thermal ionisation mass spectrometry is considered
as a technique for bulk analyses. However, a possibility to analyse particles by thermal ionisation
mass spectrometry is not excluded.
5.1 Thermal ionisation mass spectrometry
Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) is a well-recognised technique for the
precise and accurate determination of isotope ratios of the elements with low ionisation potentials.
Coupled with Isotope Dilution (ID-TIMS), the technique can be used to determine the
concentrations of elements present in a variety of matrices. TIMS is a single element and at the
most an oligoelement technique due to different ionisation energies and vapour pressures of the
elements and molecules. It can be used for the analyses of actinides, lanthanides, alkalis and
alkaline earth elements and it has been found to be a very powerful technique in nuclear
technology, geochronology and life sciences.
5.1.1 Principle
The principle of TIMS is shown in Fig.4. A sample as a solution of a salt (e.g. nitrate,
chloride) or an oxide, containing amounts varying between pg and µg of the element of interest, is
placed on a high purity filament assembly and dried. In an ion source the sample is evaporated,
ionised and accelerated. A mass analyser separates the ions according to their mass to charge
ratios (i.e. m/z values), which for the magnet analyser is followed by the law:
m/z = r2H2/2V, (15)
where r is the radius of curvature of the ions, H is the magnetic field and V is the acceleration
voltage [39]. The resolved ion beam is collected finally by the detector.
Requirements for the efficient thermal ionisation of the formation of positive ions are: high
work function of the filament material and low ionisation potential of the determined element. Due
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to their high work function and high melting point, rhenium, tantalum and tungsten are the mostly
used filament materials in positive thermal ionisation (PTI). Recently also negative thermal
ionisation (NTI) has been used for isotope ratio determination of some metal oxides and non-
metals with high ionisation potential. In this case a filament material with low work function, like
thoriated tungsten, is used [40].
Fig.4. TIMS with extended geometry and multi Faraday cup detector system [39].
5.1.2 Instrumentation
5.1.2.1 Ion source
All commercial thermal ionisation sources are equipped with rotating sample magazines
(turrets), where up to 21 filament holders can be loaded. Single, double or triple filament
assemblies can be used. Double and triple filament assemblies are favourable compared to single
filament, because the evaporation and ionisation conditions are easier to control with separate
filaments. The formation of positive ions in the thermal ionisation source is governed by the
Langmuir equation:
n
+/n0 ∝ exp(Φ-I)/kT (16)
where n0 and n+ represent the number of neutral atoms/molecules and the number of positive ions
leaving the filament, respectively, Φ is the work function of the filament material, I is the first
25
ionisation potential of the element, k is the Boltzmann constant and T is the temperature of the
filament [39].
In the double filament assembly, the sample is evaporated on the evaporation filament, in
which the atoms and molecules come loose. The atoms/molecules draw close to the ionisation
filament, where they are ionised by losing an electron (or in NTI gaining an electron). In triple
filament assembly, the sample is placed on two side filaments, while the central filament acts as the
ionisation filament. This arrangement can be used to compare two different samples (e.g. a
standard and an unknown sample) under the same ion source conditions. The positive ion beam is
then accelerated and focused in the collimator with several lenses by applying a potential (Fig.5).
A variety of specially prepared filament surfaces are employed in TIMS with the objective of
improving the ionisation efficiency especially for single filament measurements, controlling the
rate of evaporation or maximising the yield of production of a particular ion [41-48].
The sensitivity of a thermal ion source is usually given by the number of sample atoms
evaporated from one of the filaments in order to produce one ion at the output of the mass
spectrometer. Typical values are from 5 % for Pb in a single filament silica gel environment down
to less than 0.01 % for Hf in a triple filament source. All other important elements, such as U and
Pu, range between these limits [40].
Fig.5. Schematic diagram of a double filament thermal ionisation ion source [40].
5.1.2.2 Mass analysers
The mass analyser separates ions according to their mass-to-charge ratio. The main types
of mass analysers used in mass spectrometry include magnetic sector, quadrupole, time-of-flight
(TOF) and Fourier transform ion cyclotron resonance. Conventionally, the single stage magnetic
26
sector analyser has been used for mass separation in TIMS, because the ions formed in the thermal
ionisation source have only thermal energies and their energy spread is small (0.1 to 0.2 eV). The
90° magnetic sector has been found to be a useful configuration in many commercial instruments
and it has displaced the older 180° and 60° sectors. In normal geometry, the central path of the
ion beam is perpendicular to the magnetic analyser at the entrance and the exit. When the
extended geometry is used (Fig.4), the ions are allowed to enter and leave the magnetic analyser
at oblique incidence angle 26.5°. This configuration focuses the ion beam in the Z-direction and
doubles the dispersion of the ions in the magnetic field with the same radius of curvature
compared to normal geometry. Therefore the resolution of the mass spectrometer is improved and
resolution between 400-500 (defined as M/∆M at 10 % valley) is reached [39,49].
5.1.2.3 Detection
Mass separated ions are collected by a detector. Four detector types are used in TIMS:
Faraday cup, Secondary Electron Multiplier (SEM), Daly detector and Channel Electron
Multiplier (Channeltron). The Faraday cup is used when sufficient ion current is available to
obtain electric current in a range of 10-14–10-10 A. For measuring small ion currents or very low
abundant isotopes, i.e. currents from 10-18 to 10-13 A, SEM, Daly and Channeltron are used.
The Faraday cup serves as a source for charge compensating electrons when measuring
positive ions (or as a sink in the case of negative ions). These electrons are then measured as an
ordinary electric current. This is achieved by feeding the electron current through a high ohmic
resistor, typically 1011 Ω, and by measuring the voltage across this resistor. The inner surface of
the Faraday cup is coated with a material of low sputter rate, e.g. porous carbon and the width to
length ratio of the cup is made as small as possible, to prevent reflected or sputtered particles
leaving the cup. After many years of using just single collector system, recently multi-collection
with Faraday cup has become favourable and up to 9 isotopes can be measured at the same time.
This makes it possible to achieve an internal precision of 0.001 % on isotope ratios [40].
In SEM the collected ions hit the ion-electron conversion dynode, which releases
electrons. The electrons are accelerated to the following electron-electron dynode, and typically
10-16 dynodes one after the other are used. Between each of the dynode, several hundred volts
acceleration voltage is applied to reach finally amplification factor of about 108 for an ion. SEM
can be used in two modes: analog (i.e. measuring current) or pulse counting mode. The advantage
of the SEM used in analog mode is its high sensitivity, but as a disadvantage it has poor precision
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due to the variable amplification factor, which depends on the mass of the measured ion. When
using SEM in pulse counting mode, it is inherently noiseless and only rarely may electrons be
produced by field effect tunnelling or by cosmic rays, resulting a dark noise rate of only few
counts per minute. However, at high count rates the linearity suffers due to the dead time effect
[40,49].
Before SEM, a somewhat different ion-counting device, a Daly detector was presented.
Ions are accelerated by 20-40 kV to a secondary-emitting electrode. The realised secondary
electrons are accelerated by the same electrostatic field to hit a grounded scintillator. There they
are converted to photons, which are then detected by an ordinary photomultiplier. Except for a
slightly higher dark noise value for Daly, the two detector types (SEM and Daly) do not differ in
the quality of the ion counting [40,49].
During the last few years, a new kind of ion-counting detector, the Channeltron, has
become available. The Channeltron consist of a ceramic body with a small, curved, interior
channel (Fig.6). The inside wall is coated with a thin layer of high resistance lead oxide. A
negative high voltage (~2000 V) is applied on the entrance to generate an avalanche of electrons
for each entering ion. The biggest advantage of the Channeltrons, compared to other ion-counting
detectors, is their compact size, which gives the possibility to replace the Faraday cups by them
and measure low ion currents by multi-collection. A disadvantage is the variable amplification
factor caused by different points on the entry where the ions hit [49,50].
Fig.6. Schematic diagram of a Channeltron [50].
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5.1.3 Isotope ratio measurements
Isotopic ratios measured with a thermal ionisation mass spectrometer are seldom the
“true” ratios of a sample under study. Many factors have to be taken into account, among these
being the effects arising from the instrumental parameters; these are taken care of through
calibration (Chapter 5.1.3.1). Effect arising from the measurement process itself is essentially
isotopic fractionation (Chapter 5.1.3.2). Afterwards the expected atom ratio (R ( )/correctedi j ) can be
calculated as follows:
R ( )
/
corrected
i j
= [ ]RGain CF B j i
measured
i j i j
( )
/ /( ) ( )
( )
×
× + × −1 (17)
where (Gain)i/j is the relative gain ratio of the amplifiers used to measure isotopes i and j, (CF)i/j is
the relative Faraday cup efficiency factor, B is the isotopic fractionation factor per atomic mass
unit (1/(j-i) )1/( // −× jiobsjitrue RR ) and (j-i) is the atomic mass difference of the measured isotopes
[51].
5.1.3.1 Calibration
The calibration procedure depends on the measurement mode that is going to be
performed i.e. peak jumping (dynamic) or multi-collection (static). In peak jumping, a single
detector is used and by switching the magnetic field, isotopes in question are measured
subsequently. The calibration in this case is very simple, requiring only the mass calibration (called
also the magnet calibration). The full-scale mass calibration is performed normally using the
isotopes 23Na, 41K, 185Re, 187Re, 238U and 244Pu.
When measuring by the multi-collection mode (i.e. isotopes are measured simultaneously
with an array of detectors), more calibration parameters have to be considered. This is caused by
the detectors, which may vary with respect to their geometry, construction and component
materials. Detectors calibration against each other includes gain calibration, cup efficiency
calibration, linearity check and, in a case of different detector types, normalisation between them.
Collectors have to be set also on the right positions on the focal axis, so that all the isotopes are
collected in the each collector from the centre of the flat-top peak.
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In gain calibration the amplifiers of the adjustable Faraday cups are calibrated against the
amplifier of the fixed Faraday cup by applying the ground potential and constant signal of 9V to
all amplifiers one by one. Later the gain per volt is calculated and stored in the software [51].
Cup efficiency calibration checks the response of stable ion beam in the Faraday cups,
which should be near unity. Cup efficiency factor (CF) can be determined using either peak-shift
or peak-jump experiments. In the peak-shift experiment, isotopes can be placed into different
detectors by moving the mass spectrum to the high or low mass side in increments of one mass
unit. The CF is then calculated from the isotope ratios measured with different configurations. The
peak-jump experiment selects a stable ion beam of single isotope to measure ion intensities in each
movable detector and a reference detector with symmetrical scanning sequence. The peak-jump
experiment is favourable over the peak-shift experiment because 1) no fractionation is involved for
a single isotope, 2) no dependency on different isotopes, 3) direct comparison between detectors,
4) applicable to any detector configuration, and 5) the same magnitude of ion intensities is
measured in each detector. However, if the signal is not very stable, there occur time dependent
effects. Thus the measurement sequence has to be symmetrical. The CF values have been noticed
to be independent of the measured element for Faraday cups, however the magnitude of the ion
intensities can affect the CF values, thus the calibration should be performed using the same ion
intensity level as later in the sample measurements [51,52].
The linearity of the detectors can be check by measuring the IRMM 072 reference
materials with 233U/235U atom ratios ranging between 1 and 2×10-6, 235U/238U ratios being near
unity. The 233U, 235U and 238U isotopes are measured in each detector using peak jumping mode.
The linearity factor of cup (x) is then given by:
LF(x) = 
R
Rc
3 5
3 5
/
’
/
(18)
where R 3 5/
c is the certified 233U/235U ratio, R 3 5/
’
 = R3/5 × (1 + 2× B), B = (K-1)/3, and K = R 5 8/c /R5/8
[51].
When using ion counting detectors (SEM, Daly or Channeltron) together with Faraday,
the detectors have to be calibrated against each other to determine the detector efficiency factor
(DEF). This is performed by sending reasonable low and stable ion beam to a Faraday cup and
then to Daly or SEM (peak-jump experiment). After this, the Channeltrons need still to be
calibrated against SEM or Daly with same procedure.
30
5.1.3.2 Fractionation
Fractionation is a phenomenon that is induced by the mass dependent differential
evaporation of the isotopes from the heated sample filament. This difference causes the lighter
isotope to evaporate more rapidly from the evaporation filament. The fractionation is based on the
Rayleigh’s distillation law, where the rate of evaporation is proportional to m/1 .
 During the evaporation process, the higher evaporation rate of the lighter isotope leads to
faster depletion of the sample in this isotope and the observed ratio of light to heavy isotope
decreases towards its true value and, eventually, below it. Parameters, which affect the mass
fractionation are: sample size, chemical composition and purity of the sample, sample loading
procedures on the filament, the material of the ionisation and evaporation filaments, filament
temperatures, the rate of sample heating and the time of data acquisition [53].
Many models and techniques to correct for fractionation have been developed [54,55].
The major difficulty to develop a general quantitative fractionation model is the lack of reliable or
appropriate thermodynamic data on the evaporation and ionisation species under the non-
equilibrium conditions in the thermal ionisation source. The following expressions are typically
used to correct the mass discrimination [40]:
- Linear law: linmeastr mRR ε×∆+= 1 (19)
- Power law : mpowmeastr RR ∆+= )1( ε (20)
- Exponential law: )exp( expε×∆= mRR meastr (21)
where R is the ratio of the heavier isotope m1 to the lighter isotope m2, ε is the mass bias per
atomic mass unit, and ∆m = m1-m2. In the case of U and Pu analysis, normally the linear approach
is sufficient (as in eq. 17), because of relative small mass differences and high mass numbers of the
elements leading to the Rtr/Rmeas ratio near unity.
Experimental K-factors, i.e. certified isotope ratio/observed isotope ratio, have also been
determined to correct the fractionation [53,56]. From the K-factor, a mass discrimination factor
(mdf) per mass unit can be calculated. It has been noticed that K-factors depend mostly on the
sample amount, thus it is not constant for an element of different sample sizes. It has been
observed the K-factor being unity, when ≈ 63 % of the sample is consumed [57]. Thus the data
for K-factor determination should be collected from the same segment of the isotopic
fractionation curve, which is virtually impossible.
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“Double spiking”, called also as an internal standard method, is a correction technique,
where a pure and calibrated mixture of spike isotopes (e.g. 233U and 236U) in approximately equal
amounts is mixed with an unknown sample. For example, in a case of uranium, the 233U/236U and
235U/238U ratios are determined and a correction factor, (233U/236U)meas/(233U/236U)tr, is established
and used to correct the measured 235U/238U ratio [58,59].
In the internal normalisation technique, it is assumed that the element under study has
three or more isotopes and that at least two of them are stable isotopes, whose ratio in nature is
unaltered. Such a pair of isotopes has a constant, well-established isotopic ratio and it may be
used for mass discrimination corrections. This technique is widely used e.g. in strontium and
neodymium isotope ratio determinations.
5.1.3.3 Total evaporation
The total evaporation technique is the latest application in thermal ionisation mass
spectrometry. It was described for the first time in 1987 [60]. A salient feature of the technique is
the evaporation of the entire sample while simultaneously integrating the signal of each interested
isotope by multi-collection. Thus virtually, by this technique, the fractionation problem has been
eliminated. Also the amount of sample has been reduced considerably (from µg to ng) because the
stable ion beam is no longer required and the analysis time is only a few minutes. The potential
advantages of the total evaporation method are higher accuracy and precision, which have shown
an improving factor of 2 to 4 comparing to the conventional method [61]. It is also less dependent
on the sample preparation chemistry and the sample amount on the filament can vary at least by a
factor of 20 without showing any significant bias. Different filament materials have been noticed
to affect the results. Tantalum filaments are unsuitable because of incomplete sample consumption
during the analysis from the filament. Additionally, and due to that, the isotope ratios are
positively biased. Rhenium and tungsten materials did not show these problems [61-63]. A major
disadvantage of the total evaporation technique is that isobars can not be separated by altering
evaporation conditions. However, in some cases this can be performed by deconvoluting the
contributions from two elements to a mass, because each element has a different evaporation
curve [64].
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5.1.4 Isotope dilution analysis
Isotope dilution analysis (IDA) is a quantitative determination technique to determine the
concentration of the element in the sample. The technique can be applied to the elements, which
have at least two stable or long-lived radioactive isotopes [65]. The principle of the IDA is to
compare an unknown number (NX) of atoms of an isotope to a known number (NY) of atoms of a
non-present but added isotope of the same element (called spike) through a measurement of a
ratio of numbers of atoms (RB) of two isotopes (Fig.7):
BYX RNN = (22)
The general IDA equation of multi-isotopes is defined:
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where RX, RY and RB are the isotope abundance ratios of two interested isotopes in sample, spike
and blend, respectively [66]. The net change in the isotopic composition of the sample is not only
dependent on the contrast of its isotopic composition with that of the spike but also on the relative
amounts of the sample and tracer elements in the blend. Due to that, the concentration and
composition of the spike, as well as the weight, must be known accurately. It is necessary to
ensure that all the isotopes of the element are in the same valence state after mixing the sample
and spike solutions, in other words, they have to be in chemical equilibrium. The sample has to go
usually through a chemical separation to obtain pure and isobaric interference free sample for the
isotope ratio measurements. An attractive feature of the IDA is that after the mixing of the sample
with the spike, the chemical separation of the blend does not have to be quantitative, because
isotopic ratios are measured.
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Fig.7. Principle of isotope dilution analysis [66].
5.2 Secondary ion mass spectrometry
Secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) is a technique used mainly for the
characterisation of materials in fields of the semiconductor, metallurgy, geology, organic and
biology [67,68]. Nowadays it has been found to be also a powerful tool in the particle analyses
[69,70]. SIMS has many advantages compared to other surface techniques, e.g. low detection
limits (ppm to ppb), all elements are detectable, isotopes distinguishable and insulators analysable.
On the other hand it has disadvantages like the element and matrix dependent secondary ion yields
and the isobaric mass interferences.
5.2.1 Principle
Secondary ion mass spectrometry is an analytical technique that can be used to
characterise the surface and near surface (~ 30 µm) region of solids and some liquids. The
technique uses an energetic primary ion beam (0.5-20 keV), which impact triggers off cascades of
atomic collisions, some of which end up in the ejection of one or several atoms belonging to the
most superficial layers of the sample. Many species (e.g. single and multiple charged ions, clusters
of several atoms and neutrals) are formed by the interaction of the beam with the sample, but the
positive and negative ions are the species of interest for SIMS. The sputtered secondary ions
supply information about the elemental, isotopic and molecular composition of the material, and
they are detected by a mass spectrometer (Fig.8).
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Fig.8. SIMS technique block diagram [71].
5.2.2  Instrumentation
5.2.2.1 Primary ion source
The primary ion beam is generated in the primary ion source. The choice of the primary
ion beam depends on the elements to be analysed and the type of information required. The
selection of a certain primary beam affects secondary ion yields, detection limits, depth resolution,
lateral resolution, charge neutralisation, microtopography formation, and sputtering rates. The
commonly used primary beam species are O2+, O-, Cs+, Ar+, Xe+ and Ga+, where O2+ and Cs+ are
the most typically used for the detection of electropositive and negative species, respectively, due
to their ion yield enhancement capability.
Duoplasmatron ion source is the standard type of primary ion source used with ion
microprobe instruments. In duoplasmatron, the gas (normally Ar or O) is fed to the interior of the
hollow cathode through an adjustable leak. In the hollow cathode, a plasma is produced by an arc
maintained between hollow cathode and anode. Ions are extracted from the plasma by a strong
electrostatic field produced by an extraction electrode. The duoplasmatron can furnish positive or
negative ions according to the polarity of the extraction potential [72].
Surface ionisation sources, Cs+ and I-, are used normally for two reasons: 1) to increase
the secondary ion yields of electronegative and positive elements, respectively and 2) to obtain
smaller beam size compared to the duoplasmatron source. Surface ionisation is based on electron
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exchange between the conduction band of the metal and the ground state energy level of atom’s
valence electron. For example, in vapour state caesium ionises into positive ions when it comes
into contact with the surface of a tungsten plate at a temperature of 1100 °C. The Cs+ ions are
extracted and accelerated by applying an electric field between the tungsten plate and the
extraction electrode [72,73].
5.2.2.2 Secondary ion analyser
The loosened secondary ions are extracted by electric fields and energy and mass analysed.
Depending on the analytical application, different kind of m/z analysers can be applied to perform
the mass separation. In the first generation of SIMS, magnetic sector analysers were used. Later
on, double-focusing, quadrupole and time-of-flight (TOF) analysers have been applied.
In double focusing spectrometers, a suitable combination of electrostatic and magnetic
fields is used to obtain directional focusing of a given mass-to-charge ratio ion beam, even with
heterogeneous energies (Fig.9). The secondary ion energy distribution from a sample varies with
ion species. These energy differences can be used to simplify the mass spectra. Because molecular
ions in general have a narrower energy distribution than atomic ions, an energy window can be
used to select an energy portion of the interested species.
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Fig.9. Double-focusing SIMS (Cameca IMS 6F) [73].
The quadrupole is actually a mass filter rather than an analyser because it transmit ions
having only a small range of m/z values and moreover there is no mass dispersion or focusing as in
magnetic analysers. Radio frequency (RF) and direct current (DC) electric fields are applied to a
quadrupole rod structure and one is varied to produce a mass spectrum. Because quadrupoles do
not employ magnets, peak switching for selected ion monitoring can be done quickly, which
makes them ideal for depth profiling application [71].
Time-of-flight analysers are used with secondary ion beams that are generated in short
pulses. Ions are accelerated into a drift tube in which the ions are separated according to the time
taken to traverse the drift space. When ions have the same energy, heavier ions take longer to
reach the detector than do lighter ones. TOF systems represent an area for organic materials and it
is preferred for surface analysis, cluster studies and molecular structure elucidation because of its
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virtually unlimited mass range, high mass resolution and ability to detect ions of different masses
simultaneously [71].
5.2.2.3 Detection
The detection of the secondary ions can be done either by counting the ions (electron
multiplier or Faraday cup) or using ion sensitive imaging detectors (microchannel
plate/Fluorescent screen or resistive anode encoder). The principle of Faraday cup and electron
multiplier has been explained before (Chapter 5.1.2.3), thus here is concentrated only on the
imaging.
In ion imaging, the SIMS provides a spatial distribution of selected surface chemical
constituent. In combination with depth profiling, 3-dimensional concentration maps can be
generated. The MCP/FS system consists of a microchannel plate device coupled to a fluorescent
screen. The MCP is an assembly of small channels. Each channel is a small hollow glass tube with
the inner surface coated with SiO2. When secondary ions strike the semiconductor surface, it
causes a secondary electron emission. The electrons are accelerated and multiplied by collision
cascades in the channel. The FS converts electrons in photons.
The RAE system consists also of a microchannel plate, but coupled to a resistive anode
encoder system. The RAE generates a pulse for each secondary ion incoming on the channel plate
and determines the spatial position of the gravity centre of the charges deposited by the electron
flux by sharing the charge between its four corners [73]. RAE is used for the mapping of the
entire sample surface.
Imaging can be done by two divergent ways, in ion microscope and ion microprobe mode.
When measuring with the ion microscope mode, the sample is illuminated by a large-diameter
primary ion beam so that each point of the surface may be considered as a source of secondary
ions. A magnified image of the emission current density distribution of a selected secondary ion
species, present at the sample surface, is produced on a scintillator screen. In ion microprobe
mode, called also as Scanning Ion Image (SII), the secondary ion image is produced by a narrow
illuminating ion beam, which is focused down to a small spot and rastered onto the sample
surface. Synchronously, the mass-analysed secondary ion image is formed on the cathode ray tube
(CRT) of the chassis by modulating the brightness of the spot as a function of the secondary ion
intensities at each position of the primary beam [72].
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5.2.3 Measurements
SIMS analyses can be divided into two categories, static and dynamic, depending on the
information obtained. In static SIMS the molecular information on the composition of the
uppermost monolayer is derived, without disturbing its composition and structure, when the
primary ion beam intensity is kept below 1012 ions/cm2. As the amount of matter that is sputtered
is limited, and consequently the secondary ion yield low, TOF mass analyser has been normally
chosen for static SIMS. The application is used for determination of the chemical composition of
the metals, semiconductors, plastics, biomolecules, polymers and organic materials.
In dynamic SIMS, the primary ion beam intensity is not limited and the surface erosion is
more violent and faster. Thus the supplied information is elemental and originates from deeper
layers of the bombarded sample. One of the main applications of the dynamic SIMS is the analysis
of trace elements depth distribution (e.g. dopants in semiconductors).
5.2.3.1 Matrix effect
Matrix effect is a general term used to describe differences in sensitivity for a given
element in samples of different composition. Secondary ion yields for different elements can differ
by over six orders of magnitude, and they can also vary from matrix to matrix. The emitted atomic
or molecular particles have so-called charge states, which depend strongly on the chemical
environment of the sputtered species. By changing this chemical environment, for example, going
from a pure metal to an oxide, the ionisation probability of the same species, for example, a metal
atom may be changed. The use of relative sensitivity factors (RSFs) can compensate the matrix
effects when SIMS data are processed. The RSF takes into account the differences in sputtering
rate and is a relative measure of the ionisation probability of a given element in a given matrix
[71].
5.2.3.2 Mass interferences
Mass interferences are common in SIMS because of the variety and intensity of the
molecular ions and the multiply charged species. Interferences can cause problems especially when
the matrix has more than one element, the matrix elements have more than one isotope or several
naturally occurring isotopes are of significant intensity. To solve the mass interferences, a few
techniques can be applied. Firstly, the difference in energy distributions between atomic and
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molecular ions can be used to advantage, because atomic ions have a broader energy distribution
and an offset voltage can be used to discriminate the molecular ions. Secondly, high mass
resolution (m/∆m) can be used to separate two ions with the same nominal mass (m), but with
small difference of exact mass (∆m). Magnetic sector SIMS can typically offer mass resolution of
10000, where quadrupole instruments are limited to 500. Thirdly, molecular ion or isotope based
interference subtraction can be used. In this technique, two naturally occurring isotopes of same
element (or an atomic ion and a molecular ion) are monitored in a profile and any difference in
normalised isotope profiles can be used to subtract the interference [71].
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6. Results and discussion
6.1 Age determination
Age determination of Pu material was divided in two parts depending on the sample size.
1) Bulk samples (grams of material) were analysed by ID-TIMS after elemental separation
(Pu/U/Am) and by gamma-spectrometry without separation [I]. Additionally the samples were
analysed by ICP-MS (Chapter 6.1.3). 2) Particle samples were analysed by SIMS [II]. Because
the particles are solids and very small of size (1 µm particle ≈ 10 pg), no preliminary treatment (i.e
separation and purification) could be performed for the samples.
To determine the ages of Pu, individual parent/daughter ratios were calculated using the
Nuclides 2000 program (Fig.10) [74].
Pu-241/Am-241
Pu-238/U-234
Pu-240/U-236
Pu-239/U-235
Pu-242/U-238
1
10
100
0,1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
Parent/daughter ratio
A
ge
 (y
)
Fig.10. Age vs. parent/daughter atom ratios.
When curve fittings are made, the following equations are obtained:
238Pu/234U: y = 105.38 x-0.9563 (24)
239Pu/235U: y = 34755 x-0.9998 (25)
240Pu/236U: y = 9427.1 x-0.9994 (26)
241Pu/241Am: y = 14.473 x-0.8675 (27)
242Pu/238U: y = 539167 x-1. (28)
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The curve fitting for the 241Pu/241Am ratio is valid only till ~20 a, because later the curve start to
bend due to the short half-live of the 241Pu and no good fit is possible to attain. The age can be
calculated, however, always from the general decay equation. Because the half-lives of the
daughter nuclides are long in the considered time range, their decay can be ignored. Thus the
following equations can be used:
Put = Pu0×e-λt (29)
Amt = Pu0 - Put = Pu0× (1- e-λt) (30)
RPu/Am = t
t
e
e
λ
λ
−
−
−1
⇔ t = 
R
R+1ln1λ (31)
where Put/Amt is the number of Pu/Am atoms after the time t, Pu0 is the number of Pu atoms in
the beginning and λ is the decay constant.
These equations are, of course, valid for all the parent/daughter relations under consideration.
As a matter of practice in mass spectrometric age determination, the 242Pu/238U ratio is left
out. This is due to the long half-live of 242Pu, which leads only to a minute amount of in-growing
238U. Additionally small U contamination can affect drastically the result of this ratio because 238U
is the most abundant U isotope both in natural and LWR fuel. In mass spectrometry analysis the
isobaric interference between 238Pu and 238U also prevents the possibility to determine the age
from the 242Pu/238U ratio, if the U/Pu separation before analysis has not been complete, which is
often the case.
The measured Pu/U or Pu/Am ratios are inserted in the individual parent/daughter
equations obtained from the Fig.10 and the ages are calculated. The ages from each individual
equation should be, of course, in agreement. However, sometimes inconsistencies appear, which
are normally due to:
1) Am leftovers after reprocessing. This causes higher age from the 241Pu/241Am ratio
compared to the ages from the Pu/U ratios.
2) U leftovers after reprocessing or U contamination. This causes higher ages from the
239Pu/235U (and especially from the 242Pu/238U) ratio. In the particle analysis it causes too
low age from the 238Pu/234U ratio due to the isobaric interference of 238U.
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The multiple age determination (i.e. a few parent/daughter relations) is essential in order to be
sure about the validity of the age. This is not only used to exclude the effect of daughter leftovers
from reprocessing, but also to address the potential spoofing by the perpetrators who mix
different materials. The mixture of two Pu materials of different ages gives various results as seen
in Table 5.
Table 5. Variations in calculated ages when mixing after reprocessing two different Pu materials
  of different ages. Calculations were performed with Nuclides 2000 [74].
Sample Initial composition
238Pu 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 242Pu
RR 1,9 57,0 26,3 8,2 6,7
R2 0,01 95,0 4,7 0,3 0,01
Mixture Age
238Pu/234U 239Pu/235U 240Pu/236U 241Pu/241Am
70% RR 2a + 30% R2 30a 2,06 13,67 3,99 2,22
70% RR 30a + 30% R2 2a 29,77 18,33 28,00 28,52
6.1.1 Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry (TIMS)
Four samples were analysed. SRM 946 and SRM 947 are PuSO4 ⋅ 4 H2O isotope standard
reference materials from National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, (formerly
National Bureau of Standards). R1 and R2 were originally Pu-metal pellets, but which were
oxidised during the years forming Pu oxide powders. The samples were spiked (233U and 244Pu),
and they went through the elemental separation using Dowex anion exchange resin. Later this was
replaced with UTEVA ion chromatography resin, because the higher decontamination factor was
achieved, i.e. the fractions were cleaner from the other elements. Pu and U were measured by
multi-collection TIMS using total evaporation method. The ages (Table 6) were calculated from
the parent/daughter ratios using the equations obtained from the Fig.10.
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Table 6. Determined ages in years ± 2σ by ID-TIMS (January 2000).
Sample 238Pu/234U 239Pu/235U 240Pu/236U ∆1 ∆2 ∆3
SRM 946 28.2 ± 0.3 28.6 ± 0.3 28.6 ± 0.3 -3.0 -1.5 -3.9
SRM 947 28.0 ± 0.8 28.2 ± 0.2 28.2 ± 0.2 -1.8 -3.0 -3.8
R1 31.7 ± 0.2 32.1 ± 0.2 31.8 ± 0.2 -1.5 0.9 -
R2 24.5 ± 3.4 31.3 ± 0.2 30.7 ± 0.2 -4.5 -5.5 -
∆1 = difference (in %) of the age from the 240Pu/236U ratio to the determined age from the
        
241Pu/241Am ratio by gamma-spectrometry.
∆2 = difference (in %) of the age from the 240Pu/236U ratio to the reported age (data
        obtained from the NBL files for the SRM 946 and 947, or from the package notes
        for the R1 and R2).
∆3 = difference (in %) of the age from the 240Pu/236U ratio to the age determined by
        alpha-spectrometry in [75].
The ages from different Pu/U ratios of SRM samples agree well with each other. This
shows that during the preparation of the material (i.e. reprocessing), the U has been separated
effectively from Pu. In the case of samples R1 and R2, small excess of U can been recognised,
thus ages differ slightly. The bigger difference in the age from the 238Pu/234U ratio of R2 specimen
is explained due to the small abundance of 238Pu (0.007 %), which causes inaccuracy in the
measurements. When comparing determined ages between different Pu/U and 241Pu/241Am ratios
(Table 6, ∆1), the ages show to have slight disagreement. The explanation for this can be found
from two reasons:
1) Traces of 241Am after reprocessing. All the ages from the 241Pu/241 ratio are slightly higher
than from Pu/U ratios, thus Pu/Am separation when preparing the materials, could have
been incomplete.
2) Incorrect half-live of 241Pu. Different half-live values for the 241Pu are found in the
literature even nowadays (14.29 a [76], 14.35 a [23] and 14.41 a [74]).
As the difference of the lowest and highest value of the half-live of 241Pu in the literature is less
than 1 %, and the differences between determined ages from the Pu/U and Pu/Am ratios are 1.5-
4.5 % (Table 6), the preferred reason is the Am leftovers from reprocessing. Findings of the 243Am
traces by gamma-spectrometry support also this theory.
The results of the SRM 946 and 947 samples were compared also to the data of the
preparation of these samples obtained from the old files of NBL, USA (Table 6, ∆2). No exact
dates, when the materials had been prepared, were available due to the old age of the materials.
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For the samples R1 and R2, the preliminary estimate of the age was obtained from the package
notes of the samples, where the year was indicated. Additionally, a publication was found, where
the ages of SRM standards were determined by alpha-spectrometry from the in-grown 241Am, and
the comparison between the results was done (Table 6, ∆3).
6.1.2 Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry (SIMS)
It is known that the quantitative analysis by SIMS is a rather difficult task due to the
different secondary ion yields of the elements. The secondary ion yields vary from matrix to matrix
and they also depend on the measurement conditions and the instrument itself. As a result, relative
sensitivity factors (RSFs) are applied to correct the differences. In this study, the SRM 946, SRM
947, R1 and R2 samples were used as standards to determine the RSF for the Pu/U ratio, because
their ages were known from the earlier bulk analyses by TIMS. As the analysed Pu compounds
were different (oxide and sulphate), the RSF was determined for the both matrices (Table 7).
Table 7. Relative sensitivity factors (RSF ± 1σ) of different Pu/U ratios by SIMS.
Sample 238Pu/234U 239Pu/235U 240Pu/236U
SRM 946 2.38 ± 0.08 2.36 ± 0.06 2.38 ± 0.06
SRM 947 2.33 ± 0.02 2.25 ± 0.04 2.34 ± 0.03
R1 2.41 ± 0.04 2.36 ± 0.04 2.40 ± 0.02
R2 n.d. 2.40 ± 0.01 2.49 ± 0.09
  n.d. = not determined
The average RSF value for PuSO4 samples (i.e. SRM 946 and SRM 947) is 2.34 ± 0.05
and for Pu-oxide (i.e. R1 and R2) 2.41 ± 0.05. The means do not differ significantly because they
overlap with their uncertainties. Thus no real differences could be seen. The RSF value of 2.41
was used later in the PuO2 sample analysis.
When the RFS’s for Pu- and U-oxides were determined, no uniform results were obtained
(Table 8). This is most probably due to the carbon, which was used as a planchet material and also
for coating the particles. Carbon seemed to form clusters, which caused mass interferences (e.g.
239Pu12C and 235U16O) hindering the PuO/UO- and PuO2/UO2- analyses (Fig. 11).
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Table 8. Relative sensitivity factors for Pu/U-oxide ratios by SIMS.
238PuO/234UO 239PuO/235UO 240PuO/236UO
1.30 0.11 0.30
238PuO2/234UO2 239PuO2/235UO2 240PuO2/236UO2
0.20 0.044 0.076
Fig.11. Mass scan of the R1 sample by SIMS.
After the RSF determination, two real samples were analysed. The first one, referred as
RR, is a PuO2 sample from the Round Robin inter-laboratory exercise organised by ITWG [17].
The sample was interesting, because first of its low age (~2 years), which was good to test the
limits of the method, and secondly because of the routinely used dating method, gamma
spectrometry, did give a remarkably higher age. The reason for this was that some of the Am was
co-precipitated with Pu, when the material was precipitated as oxalate. The results for two
particles are seen in Table 9. They agree well with the reported age, except the age from the
239Pu/235U ratio of the first particle, which gave slightly higher result. This particle had possibly
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surface contamination of U or it was interfered by an other kind of particle, because the powder
was found to be actually a mixture of four types of particles (Fig.12) [77].
Table 9. Results of particle age determination by SIMS (age in years ± 2σ) in February 2000.
 RR = Round-Robin test sample (two particles I and II).
 F19 = Fund-19 sample (two different PuO2 particle types 1 and 2).
Sample Reported age 238Pu/234U 239Pu/235U 240Pu/236U
RR-I 2.3 2.31 ± 0.17 4.77 ± 0.44 2.47 ± 0.02
RR-II 2.35 ± 0.10 2.66 ± 0.26 2.29 ± 0.05
F19-1 20.6 n.d. 66.2 ± 29.1 21.5 ± 0.6
F19-2 1.18 ± 0.07 51.9 ± 3.8 19.9 ± 0.3
Fig.12. SEM/TEM picture of three types of RR particles [77].
The second analysed sample was Fund-19 (referred here as F19). The F19 is a mixed oxide
(MOX) sample, seized at the Munich airport 1994. The age of the sample was determined before
for the bulk sample and the result, 20.6 a, was obtained [78]. As being MOX sample, the U
particles were interfering in SIMS analyses to the age from the 238Pu/234U ratio, where 238Pu has
isobaric interference with 238U causing too low age, and age from the 239Pu/235U ratio, where the
excess of 235U causes too high age (Table 9 in italics). The sample had interesting features, not
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only being mixed oxide, but also being mixture of two kinds of PuO2 particle (Fig.13). This raised
a question about the ages of different particle, in other words, have the powders been reprocessed
at different times. As the ages of the 240Pu/236U ratios show, no remarkable difference could been
seen, especially when F19-1 particles being smaller ones, suffer more from the presence of U and
thus giving slightly higher age compared to the bigger particles of F19-2.
Fig.13. SEM picture of F19 particles [II].
Correcting the U particles contribution to the Pu particles was tried by measuring the Pu
isotopic composition of the particles and subtracting the seen 238U surplus in 238Pu, because the Pu
isotopic composition was known from the TIMS analysis. The subtraction was performed also to
the 235U and 236U isotopes using the isotope ratios of U3O8 particles, i.e. 235U/238U = 0.01669 (±
0.84 %), 236U/238U = 0.000494 (± 1.4 %). The obtained ages from the 239Pu/235U ratios for both
Pu particle types showed to be now very low, indicating the possible existence of other source of
U contamination. As the Pu particles can contain U leftovers also from the reprocessing, which U
composition is unknown, no further correction calculations were attempted.
6.1.3 Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS)
The ages of SRM 946, SRM 947, R1 and R2 samples were determined also by inductively
coupled plasma mass spectrometry to evaluate the capability of the technique in the age
determination, which is normally used for trace analysis. The Pu isotopes (mass numbers 238-242)
and U isotopes (234-236) were measured using Elan 5000 ICP-MS from Perkin-Elmer [79].
(1) platelets of PuO2
(2) fibrous rods of PuO2
(3) rods of U3O8
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Because of the earlier analyses by TIMS and SIMS, the samples were known to be rather clean
from the “external” U and thus no ion chromatography separation was used to separate the 238U
from the 238Pu.
Table 10. Determined ages in years ± 1σ by ICP-MS (June 2000).
Sample Reported
age*
238Pu/234U 239Pu/235U 240Pu/236U ∆
SRM 946 29.0 22.5 ± 4.1 32.5 ± 6.7 27.3 ± 4.6 -5.9
SRM 947 28.6 25.6 ± 4.5 32.5 ± 6.6 33.9 ± 6.4 18.5
R1 32.2 30.1 ± 3.1 31.6 ± 4.8 32.6 ± 5.5 1.2
R2 31.1 4.0 ± 1.7 35.7 ± 4.0 32.2 ± 9.5 3.5
  * = by ID-TIMS in [I].
  ∆ = the difference of the age (in %) from the 240Pu/236U ratio to the reported age.
The concentrations of the analysed sample solutions were adjusted to ~100 ppb. This
resulted ≤ 5 ×105 counts per second (cps) for the highest isotope, 239Pu, but only 2-5 ×102 cps
for the U isotopes. As the average count rate of the U isotopes in blank was ~ 5 ×101 cps, the
precision of the U isotope measurements was poor. The standard deviations for 30
replicates/sample varied between 10 and 20 %, being in the case of R2 specimen even higher
(Table 10). The accuracy for the R1 and R2 samples was reasonable good from the 240Pu/236U
ratio, but for the SRM 946 and especially for the SRM 947 too low. The exact explanation for
this is unknown, even if the count rate of the SRM 947 was about two times lower than for other
samples. An explanation can be in the sample matrix of the SRM standards, which is sulphate,
which can possibly cause some difficulties in the ICP-MS even if very diluted samples were in
question.
The results are not corrected for the mass discrimination. It is known that in the ICP-MS
heavier isotopes are preferred. This would cause too low ages. Because the precision of the
analyses was so low, the effect of the mass discrimination was considered to be negligible.
6.2 Reactor type determination
The isotopic correlation technique was applied to determine the reactor type, where the Pu
material is originating from. The isotopic compositions of Pu in spent fuels of most common
commercial (LWR, graphite- and gas-moderated-LWR, CANDU, fast reactor) and research
reactors (36 % and 90 % 235U enriched MTR and 90% 235U enriched Triga) were calculated by
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ORIGEN2 and SCALE computer codes. The determined isotopic compositions of the six samples
were then compared to the calculated Pu compositions.
In the absence of the information from fission products and uranium isotopes, only the
correlations between Pu-isotopes themselves could be used. As it is traceable to neutron capture
and fission cross sections of different Pu-isotopes, the best correlation to illustrate the differences
between the reactor types is the correlation given in Fig.14. There the 238Pu abundance reflects the
information about the initial 235U enrichment, because the 238Pu is mainly produced through the
neutron captures from the 235U and the 242Pu/240Pu ratio indicates hardness of the neutron
spectrum (i.e. the harder spectrum the less heavier Pu-isotopes are produced via neutron capture).
In addition to the reactor type deduction figure in [III], here in Fig.14 the Magnox reactor type
curve and the F19 sample are included. This is to replenish the group of the commercial reactor
types, even if Magnox is used only in few countries. The F19 sample case was, on the other hand,
still open in the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, when the reactor type deduction was performed
to the other samples, thus it was then left out.
F19
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Fig.14. A correlation to deduce the reactor type of Pu samples.
In LWRs and RBMKs, many initial 235U enrichments are used. Thus in Fig.14, only the
ends of the typical enrichments were drawn (i.e. 1.8 % RBMK and 3.5 % LWR), when all the rest
place between them. Due to the similar neutron spectra, it is impossible to separate PWR and
BWR from each other. The RBMK is, however, possible to separate from the rest LWRs using
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correlation presented in Fig.15. This is due to the softer spectrum in RBMKs, which produces
more 240Pu than in the other LWRs.
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Fig.15. A correlation to distinguish between LWR and RBMK reactor Pu.
In geology and cosmochemistry, where the isotopic correlation technique is used regularly
to distinguish the isotopic anomalies, it is recommended to use three-dimensional plots with the
same reference isotope. This would, in the case of seven different reactor types, make rather
complicated and tangled plots. Thus here, another kind of approach was used. The three isotope
ratios, 238Pu/240Pu, 239Pu/240Pu and 242Pu/240Pu, of the sample were compared to the calculated
isotope ratios of the reactor types, which were nearest to the sample in Fig.14. This is
demonstrated for the samples SRM 947, RR and F19 in Fig.16-18.
In the Figures 16-18, the possible reactor and fuel types are given with their initial 235U
enrichment and final burn-up (in parenthesis). The differences between the isotope ratios of the
sample and calculations are presented in bars, but also the exact values are given in the tables
below. For the sample RR, the best fits are found with the BWR 3.5 % 235U (35 GWd/tHM),
PWR 3.1 % 235U (35 GWd/tHM) and PWR 3.5 % 235U (40 GWd/tHM). For the SRM 947, the
Magnox reactor, which in Fig.14 could be a possible origin, can be excluded on the grounds of the
Fig.17. The best fits are obtained for the BWR 3.0 % 235U (12 GWd/tHM) and PWR 3.5 % 235U
(15 GWd/tHM). The F19, which in Fig.14 places on the curve of 1.8 % 235U enriched RBMK,
shows in Fig.18 that it does not originate from any commercial reactor type.
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RR
-30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30%
BWR 3.0 (35)
BWR 3.5 (35)
BWR 3.5 (40)
PWR 3.1 (35)
PWR 3.5 (35)
PWR 3.5 (40)
VVER 3.6 (36)
VVER 3.6 (39)
239/240 -3,7% -6,2% 3,6% -6,2% -9,0% 1,2% -24,0% -18,0%
238/240 -13,9% -8,7% -25,4% 4,1% 9,5% -10,2% -11,4% -19,9%
242/240 -7,1% 7,9% -2,6% 6,9% 21,4% 8,2% 9,8% -0,1%
BWR 
3.0 
(35)
BWR 
3.5 
(35)
BWR 
3.5 
(40)
PWR 
3.1 
(35)
PWR 
3.5 
(35)
PWR 
3.5 
(40)
VVER 
3.6 
(36)
VVER 
3.6 
(39)
Fig.16. The Pu isotope ratios of RR compared to possible reactor and fuel types.
SRM 947
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VVER 3.3 (15)
Magn-ox (7)
239/240 -9,8% 4,9% -2,3% -16,6% -1,9% -7,8% -10,8% 150,1%
238/240 6,5% -24,1% -18,4% 21,5% -12,3% -7,3% -15,5% 113,0%
242/240 8,3% -27,1% -8,0% 33,2% -10,9% 7,8% -1,4% 3,3%
BWR 
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Fig.17. The Pu isotope ratios of SRM 947 compared to possible reactor and fuel types.
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F19
-20,0% 0,0% 20,0% 40,0% 60,0% 80,0% 100,0% 120,0%
RBMK 1.8 (10)
BWR 1.9 (8)
BWR 1.9 (10)
PWR 2.1 (10)
239/240 174,7% 62,9% 88,2% 72,9%
238/240 119,6% 50,0% 13,5% 31,3%
242/240 0,4% 7,4% -25,7% -3,2%
RBMK 1.8 (10) BWR 1.9 (8) BWR 1.9 (10) PWR 2.1 (10)
Fig.18. The Pu isotope ratios of F19 compared to possible reactor and fuel types.
The obtained results from the Fig.14-18 are summarised in Table 11. Even in the cases of
R1 and F19, where the reactor type was not found, all commercial reactor types could be
excluded. In the case of R1, which was suspected to be a mixture of two fuels, the calculated
60%/40% mixture of VVER 3.6 % 235U (15 GWd/tHM) fuel and MTR 90 % 235U (300
GWd/tHM) spent fuel was found to be rather near the sample composition. Some efforts were
also made to determine to the burn-up and initial enrichment, but this with less success. This is
understandable considering this simple approach of the isotopic correlation. Additionally one has
to recall that:
1. In the ORIGEN2 calculations, the irradiation was assumed to be continuous and no
cooling time correction was made.
2. The calculations have rather large error bars, especially for less abundant Pu isotopes in
BWR (see Chapter 4.1.3.).
3. The nuclear engineering handbook, where most of the information was obtained, is not
complete and some data (i.e. different enrichments in the same reactor) is missing.
4. Often many batches are reprocessed at the same time and thus the recovered Pu can be a
mixture of a few spent fuel batches.
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Table 11. Summary of the reactor type determination.
Sample Known data Information from the isotopic
correlation graphs
Information
obtained from
producer etc.
Reactor type 235U
enrichment
Burn-up
(GWd/tHM)
SRM 946 Isotope standard
from USA
LWR > 3.5 % ~ 15 PWR, Yankee, 3.7
%, 11.3 GWd/tHM
SRM 947 Isotope standard
from USA
LWR ~ 3 %  ~ 10 BWR, Dresden 1,
1.5-2.5 %, 24.2
GWd/tHM
R1 Originates from
Russia
None of the commercial
or known research
reactors; mixture ?
- - -
R2 Originates from
Russia
Graphite-moderated-
LWR
~ 2 % 1-2 -
RR European fuel LWR 3.0-3.5 % 35-40 PWR, 3.28 %,
34-36 GWd/tHM
F19 - None of the commercial
or known research
reactors
- - -
Even if the reactor type is one of the key parameters in the origin determination, it is not
alone enough to reveal the reprocessing plant, where the spent fuel was reprocessed. In addition
chemical and material properties (e.g. impurities, platelet and grain sizes) play important role
because they tell about the used process itself, which normally varies depending on the fabrication
plant. However, a databank is needed to interpret this kind of data. In this study these parameters
were beyond the aim.
6.3 Multi-Micro-Channeltron Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometer
The detector configuration of the Multi-Micro-Channeltron Mass Spectrometer (MMC-
TIMS) was slightly modified since it had been presented in [IV]. The L1 Channeltron (i.e. the first
Channeltron on the low mass side from the axial Faraday/Daly detector) was replaced by a
Faraday cup, because there was no need for four Channeltrons in the array. Thus now for the ion
counting, four detectors (Channeltrons L4-L2 and the Daly) are used, which is enough to measure
the most important U isotopes, i.e. 234U, 235U, 236U and 238U. For the age determination only three
isotopes, 234U, 235U and 236U, are of interest and the Daly detector can be left out. Pu cannot be
measured by the MMC-TIMS, because the ion source is not attached to a glove-box, and thus the
contamination risk is high.
The first task was to check the stability of the Channeltrons. It is known that Channeltrons
suffer from the ageing effect, i.e. they loose their efficiency with time [50]. Two sets of
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measurements were performed with a time lapse of six months, each set lasting around a week
(Table 12). The ageing effect is seen to be small over a few days, but discernible for the L2 and L3
Channeltrons being 6-12 % in the first and ~ 4 % in the second test period. The L4 had problems
in the second test period and later it “died” completely. The problem was solved by adjusting the
electronical set-ups and the efficiency of the L4 was brought back to the level of the other
Channeltrons. As Channeltrons have a kind of “continuous amplification”, i.e. they have a curved
channel where the electrons are multiplied and not certain number of dynodes, the amplification is
dependent on the spot on the entrance area, where the ion hits. This influence can be perceived
from the gain values, which sometimes jump randomly. However, even without absolute
monotonous trend, the ageing effect can be recognised. Due to this fact, the gain calibration
should be repeated every day before sample measurements.
Table.12. Short and long term stability of the Channeltrons gain calibration (± 1σ).
Date Daly/L2 Daly/L3 Daly/L4
02.03. am 0.00975 0.01232 0.01224
02.03. pm 0.00978 0.01241 0.01241
03.03. am 0.00992 0.01298 0.01265
04.03. am 0.01025 0.01328 0.01306
04.03. pm 0.01010 0.01344 0.01310
05.03. am 0.01022 0.01368 0.01344
08.03. am 0.01011 0.01380 0.01341
09.03. am 0.01037 0.01387 0.01392
10.03. am 0.00959 0.01301 0.01299
10.03. pm 0.00951 0.01313 0.01293
Average 0.00996 (± 3.0 %) 0.01319 (± 4.1 %) 0.01302 (± 3.9 %)
28.09. am 0.01017 0.01392 0.01699
28.09. pm 0.01018 0.01363 0.01735
29.09. am 0.01034 0.01385 0.01912
29.09. am 0.01037 0.01376 0.01935
29.09. pm 0.01050 0.01382 0.01973
30.09. am 0.01039 0.01383 0.02030
30.09. pm 0.01051 0.01411 0.02100
01.10. am 0.01056 0.01426 0.02156
Average 0.01038 (± 1.4 %) 0.01390 (± 1.4 %) 0.01943 (± 8.3 %)
Next, the performance of Channeltrons was tested by measuring uranium U-500 standard
in the double filament system and using the total evaporation method. The certified values of the
234U/238U, 235U/238U and 236U/238U ratios of the U-500 standard are 0.010422, 0.999698 and
0.001519, respectively. Three sample sizes (100, 50 and 10 pg) were used. The 50 pg sample
amount gave a sufficiently high signal of 3 mV ≅ 180 000 counts per second (cps) on the 235U and
238U for few minutes. The results in Table 13 shows that for the 235U/238U ratio reasonable
accuracy and precision was obtained regardless of the sample size. The 234U/238U and 236U/238U
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ratios, however, suffered from the high background, which was noticed existing in all half masses
(Fig.19). The background is not constant, varying from a few hundred of cps to thousands of cps
(Table 13). Thus, the minor isotope measurements of the U-500 sample, where the count rates of
234U and 236U are only ~1900 and 270 cps are to be expected, could not be performed. Until now,
the instrument manufacturer could not solve this problem.
Table 13. Results of the U-500 standard by MMC-TIMS (± 1σ).
Sample 234U/238U 235U/238U 236U/238U 235U total Background cps
amount current (V) 234 235 236 238
100 pg 0.0094224 1.0266686 - 0.40 2409 2331 2775 4919
“ 0.0079966 1.0305115 - 1.45 641 522 463 575
“ 0.0022858 1.0594599 - 1.10 1722 1450 1494 4138
“ 0.0041939 0.9929254 - 0.21 1006 756 659 1209
“ 0.0078414 0.9953231 - 0.27 547 472 472 903
“ 0.0085718 0.9955448 0.0007519 0.20 431 659 309 272
“ - 0.9771249 - 0.18 5309 7822 3681 7778
“ 0.0078743 0.9912534 - 0.60 672 547 503 781
Average 0.0068837
(± 38 %)
1.0086015
(± 2.7 %)
0.0007519
Bias - 34 % + 0.89 % - 51 %
50 pg 0.0091227 0.9808046 0.0005903 0.14 666 606 500 650
“ 0.0067277 0.9741435 - 0.37 863 681 713 1959
“ 0.0030255 1.0348519 - 0.35 1088 775 838 3347
“ 0.0018690 1.0033794 - 0.32 972 713 622 1750
“ - 1.0457472 - 0.26 1816 1691 1513 5247
“ 0.0085008 1.0405884 0.0000224 0.036 266 316 266 50
“ 0.0056571 0.9738184 - 0.059 569 491 434 613
“ 0.0088455 0.9728168 0.0001886 0.23 494 469 453 388
Average 0.0062498
(± 46 %)
1.0032688
(± 3.2 %)
0.0002671
(± 109 %)
Bias - 40 % + 0.36 % - 82 %
10 pg 0.0090329 1.0113981 - 0.081 491 447 422 347
“ - 1.0221910 - 0.034 1228 1009 897 2331
“ 0.0050572 0.9995712 - 0.081 563 491 478 900
“ - 1.0356489 - 0.030 1716 1188 1134 3278
“ - 0.9963684 - 0.066 2053 1647 1163 2272
“ 0.0021651 0.9556537 - 0.018 397 366 331 441
“ - 0.9693979 - 0.027 903 669 638 1116
“ - 1.0011649 - 0.022 928 578 938 463
“ - 0.9693576 - 0.033 1378 953 1256 1088
Average 0.0054184
(± 64 %)
0.9956391
(± 2.7 %)
-
Bias - 48 % - 0.41 % -
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Fig.19. Typical background spectrum scanned from the mass 220 to 240 by MMC-TIMS.
Uranium fractions of the R1 and R2 samples were measured with the MMC-TIMS to
compare the results with the multi-collector Faraday cup results obtained in [I]. The results
presented in Table 14, show to be much better compared to the earlier U-500 results. This is due
to the U ratios, which are near unity in these samples. When going towards lower ratios (e.g. the
234U/235U ratio of R2), the effect of the background is seen again, causing large negative bias.
Table 14. Results of the uranium fractions of the R1 and R2 by MMC-TIMS (± 1σ).
Sample 234U/235U 236U/235U
R1-1 3.7168489 0.7303831
R1-2 3.6067998 0.7293618
R1-3 3.6866094 0.7293618
R1-4 3.5881064 0.7140720
R1-5 3.5762641 0.7201290
R1-6 3.5801591 0.7164839
R1-7 3.5925902 0.7247230
R1-8 3.5607755 0.7337143
Average 3.61352 (± 1.6 %) 0.72598 (± 1.2 %)
[I] 3.63851 (± 0.016 %) 0.73710 (± 0.016 %)
Bias - 0.69 % - 1.5 %
R2-1 0.0174920 0.1690021
R2-2 0.0161506 0.1690330
R2-3 0.0151938 0.1690148
R2-4 0.0154819 0.1716953
R2-5 0.0164257 0.1705017
R2-6 0.0133354 0.1708411
R2-7 0.0137887 0.1737765
Average 0.01564 (± 17 %) 0.17139 (± 2.0 %)
[I] 0.01674 (± 0.12 %) 0.17598 (± 0.018 %)
Bias - 6.6 % - 2.6 %
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In summary, at the moment the MMC-TIMS can be used to measure a few tens pg of
U/filament by total evaporation method, which is ~ 1000 times less than with conventional
Faraday-TIMS. This is, however, valid only for isotope ratios near unity, i.e. the isotopes, which
give signal high enough and thus are not affected by the high background. When the background
problem is solved, then even smaller sample sizes can probably be measured because the maximum
counting rate can be reduced.
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7. Conclusions
Plutonium is a very radiotoxic element, possessing not only a health hazard, but also in a
view of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The concern of state authorities around Pu
intensified in the beginning of 1990’s, when smuggling cases of nuclear weapon material were
revealed. For the seized Pu material, its origin determination is one of the first and main points to
be found out. The age and the reactor type, in which the Pu was produced, are two of the major
parameters to be determined in order to unravel the origin.
The age determination of bulk and particle samples can be performed by TIMS and SIMS,
respectively. The ages of the bulk samples agree within 1 % for the three different Pu/U ratios,
238Pu/234U, 239Pu/235U and 240Pu/236U, as determined by IDMS. When compared to the gamma-
spectrometric measured age from the 241Pu/241Am ratio, which is a routinely used for age
determination, small disagreements between the ages were noticed. One explanation could be the
Am leftover after reprocessing, the other, with less extent, an incorrect 241Pu half-live. This
observation shows the importance of determining the age from two independent, i.e. Pu/U and
Pu/Am, parent/daughter relations.
In particle age determination, SIMS proved to be a sensitive analytical tool. However, to
obtain accurate results, a special care has to be taken, first in sample preparation, in order not to
cross-contaminate it, and secondly in using the appropriate relative sensitivity factor. The
attractive feature of particle age determination is the possibility to “look into” mixture of powders.
By SIMS different ages of particles in mixtures can be found, which is not the case in bulk sample
analysis. Even more important is the possibility to determinate the age of Pu particles released to
the environment in a view of the pending Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Contrary to enriched
235U production where the present baseline has to be established by numerous analyses, the
violation of Pu production could be perceived from the age of its particles.
As a third technique for age determination, the direct injection ICP-MS was tested. An
advantage of the ICP-MS is its higher sensitivity compared to conventional TIMS, but on the
other hand, it suffers in accuracy. However, for a first indication of the age, ICP-MS has a place
due to its simple sample preparation and fast analytical procedure.
The second parameter, i.e. the reactor type, can be determined using the isotope
correlation technique. The isotope ratios of the samples were compared to ORIGEN2 and
SCALE computer code calculated isotope ratios. The reactor types, where the Pu samples
originate from, were found out for most of the cases. For more detailed information, e.g. burn-up
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and initial 235U enrichment, the ICT suffered from lack of the accuracy of the simplifying computer
codes. As the produced Pu can be a mixture of several reprocessed spent fuel batches, the
blending would falsify the original Pu composition anyway.
A new detector type TIMS, Multi-Micro-Channeltron-TIMS was tried in order to reduce
the sample sizes required for TIMS analysis. The small size Channeltrons used in array for multi-
collection, which has been possible before only for the less sensitive Faraday cups, was
demonstrated. Only a few tens of pg of U was needed for total evaporation technique. However,
limitations for the low abundant isotopes were met, because of high background found in half
masses. The reason for this was not clear and thus the minor isotopes with less than few per cent
in content, cannot be determined accurately by this approach.
In summary, the origin determination of Pu could be demonstrated successfully in this
study. State authorities are now in a position to find out the possible source of illicit trafficked Pu,
and to monitor within the pending fissile material cut-off treaty the production of Pu.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BWR = Boiling Water Reactor
CANDU = Once-through Canada Deuterium Uranium Reactor
DOE = Department of Energy
FBR = Fast Breeder Reactor
FMCT = Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
FSU = Former Soviet Union
GDMS = Glow Discharge Mass Spectrometry
HEU = High Enriched Uranium
HWR = Heavy Water Reactor
IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency
ICP-MS = Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry
IDA = Isotope Dilution Analysis
IDMS = Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry
ITWG = International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling
LEU = Low Enriched Uranium
LMFBR = Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor
LWR = Light Water Reactor
MMC = Multi-Micro-Channeltron
ORIGEN = The ORNL Isotope Generation and Depletion Code
ORNL = Oak Ridge National Laboratories
RBMK = High-Power Channel-Type Reactor (abbreviation from Russian)
RSF = Relative Sensitivity Factor
SCALE = Standardised Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation
SEM = Secondary Electron Multiplier / Scanning Electron Microscope
SIMS = Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry
TEM = Transmission Electron Microscopy
TIMS = Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry
TOF = Time-of-Flight
VVER = Pressurised Water-Water Energetic Reactor (abbreviation from Russian)
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  RDA     ORIGEN2, VERSION 2.1 (8-1-91) SAMPLE PROBLEM #2
  RDA     * SAMPLE #2 IS A SIMPLE IRRADIATION OF PWR FUEL ONLY
  RDA     UPDATED BY:  SCOTT B. LUDWIG, OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
  BAS     ONE METRIC TON OF PWRU FUEL
  RDA     -1 = FRESH U FUEL WITH IMPURITIES (1 MT)
  RDA     WARNING:  VECTORS ARE OFTEN CHANGED WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CONTENT.
  RDA     THESE CHANGES WILL BE NOTED ON RDA CARDS.
  CUT     5 0.0000000001 -1
  LIP     0 0 0
  LIB     0  1 2 3   601  602  603   9   3   0  1    38
  PHO     0  0  0   10
  TIT     INITIAL COMPOSITIONS OF UNIT AMOUNTS OF FUEL AND STRUCT MAT’LS
  RDA     READ FUEL COMPOSITION INCLUDING IMPURITIES (1000 KG)
  INP     -1   1  -1  -1  1  1
  TIT     IRRADIATION OF ONE METRIC TON OF PWRU FUEL
  MOV     -1   1   0   1.0
  HED      1                                                CHARGE
  BUP
  IRP         50.0   40.0     1    2   4 2  END OF THIS STEP=  2,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP       125.0   40.0     2    3   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=  5,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP       200.0   40.0     3    4   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=  8,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP       250.0   40.0     4    5   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=10,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP       300.0   40.0     5    6   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=12,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP       375.0   40.0     6    7   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=15,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP       500.0   40.0     7    8   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=20,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP       625.0   40.0     8    9   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=25,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP       750.0   40.0     9  10   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=30,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP       875.0   40.0   10  11   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=35,000  MWD/MTIHM
  IRP     1000.0   40.0   11  12   4 0  END OF THIS STEP=40,000  MWD/MTIHM
  BUP
  OPTL      24*8
  OPTA        4*8    7 8 8   17*8
  OPTF      24*8
  OUT      -12    1     -1    0
  OUT       12    1     -1    0
  MOV      12    1      0   1.0
  DEC      1.0    1   2   5   4
  DEC      2.0    2   3   5   0
  DEC      3.0    3   4   5   0
  DEC      5.0    4   5   5   0
  DEC      7.0    5   6   5   0
  DEC    10.0    6   7   5   0
  OUT      -6     1     -1    0
  OUT       6     1     -1    0
  END
  2   942380 0.0   922350 35000.  932370 0.0   922380 965000.       FUEL 3.5%
  2   942390 0.        942400 0.      942410 0.     942420 0.                  FUEL IMPU
  4   080000 134454. 090000  10.7   110000  15.0    120000    2.0    FUEL IMPU
  4   130000  1190.  140000  1080.   150000  48.0    170000    5.3    FUEL IMPU
  4   200000  2.0    220000  847.0  230000  3.0     240000   23400    FUEL IMPU
  4   250000  2100.  260000 75500.   270000  120.  280000  25600. FUEL IMPU
  4   290000  10.    300000  40.3   420000  50.    470000   0.1           FUEL IMPU
  4   480000  25.0   490000  2.0    500000  4000.    640000   2.5       FUEL IMPU
  4   740000  2.0    820000  1.0    830000  0.4     0        0.0                FUEL IMPU
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Appendix B
BONAMI: retrieves multigroup cross sections and perform for all the nuclides a preliminary calculation of the self-shielding based on a simplified zero-
dimensional method (Bondarenko method)
NITAWL: computes for the main resonant nuclides the self-shielding factors using the Nordheim integral method which takes into account the 1-D pin
geometry
XSDRNPM: solves the Boltzmann equation of neutron transport in the 1-D cell geometry, computes the space-energy distribution of neutron flux and
average 1-group cross sections
COUPLE: updates ORIGEN libraries with the cross sections and spectral parameters computed by XSDRNPM, creating problem and burnup
dependent libraries
ORIGENS: computes the isotopic evolution of fuel composition
Flow diagram of the SAS2H sequence
